Chapter 5 pgs 82-111
On Mossadegh:
What did Mossadegh lack that a true statesman needs? For one thing, his dearth of general knowledge always astounded me. Although he had studied abroad, he knew almost nothing about other countries. His special weakness seemed to be in economics. I am in no sense a professional economist, yet somehow I have managed to learn the more common facts and principles of national and international economics. As Shah I have dealt with countless officials of varying backgrounds and political persuasions; but in all candour I must say that rarely have I met anyone in a responsible position who matched Mossadegh's ignorance of the elementary principles of production, trade, and other economic factors. This was to me amazing. Since Mossadegh was not stupid, and indeed was something of a scholar, I can only account for his economic naivete by assuming that he was so wrapped up in his emotions that he had become incapable of objectively studying any economic question.
On Mossadegh's "negative equilibrium":
I remember one day Mossadegh told me to my face that my father was a traitor. I asked why. He said because my father had built the Trans-Iranian railway just to please the British, who wanted to use it to invade Russia. Then I asked if, according to his theory, my father should have built the railway in a different direction. His answer was that my father should have built no railways whatsoever, that Iran didn't need them, and that she was better off without them. Warming to this subject, Mossadegh went on to declare that before my father's time Iran had no railways or ports worth mentioning, you could scarcely call the roads by that name, and in Tehran people had to walk in the dirt and mud because there was no pavement. But at least said Mossadegh, Iran was independent. Pointing out the error in his logic, I reminded him that before my father's reign Iran was still under the yoke of capitulations. In that period half the country was dominated by the Russians and the other half by the British. Law enforcement was then so ineffective that even in early evening a wise man kept off the streets of Tehran, which were infested by thieves. In what way, I asked Mossadegh, were we then independent? He had no answer. But I could see that my arguments had not altered the conclusion to which his weird reasoning brought him.
On Mossadegh's policies:
....when Mossadegh later became Prime Minister, he stopped my programme of distributing royal lands to poverty-ridden peasants. This project was a practical means of helping the common people of my country to raise their standard of living, but Mossadegh couldn't tolerate such direct and positive action. The social welfare aspects of my programme seemed not to interest him at all. I think, too, he was jealous of the popularity of my land distribution scheme; and he, a wealthy landlord who was hanging on to his properties, felt ashamed by the precedent I established by dividing my holdings. Fortunately Mossadegh was overthrown before he could fritter away my lands.
On Mossadegh's national defence and domestic security policies:
Mossadegh's negativism extended also into the fields of national defence and domestic security. Repeatedly he told me that Iran, having suffered from the incursions of big powers, should in the future make no attempt to defend herself. He didn't propose to advertise this policy abroad; he merely wanted it understood within the country that if anybody invaded Iran we should offer no resistance.
He not only preached but also practised the same doctrine with regard to riots and civil disturbances at home. During his premiership in 1952 and 1953, when Tudeh and other mobs increasingly terrorized the capital and other of our leading cities, Mossadegh didn virtually nothing to stop them. During these outbreakshe usually posted tanks and well-armed troops throughout Tehran, but restrained the from effective action. Riots, looting, and pitched street battles went on under the very eyes of the security forces which, under Mossadegh's order, were reduced to the role of spectators. Eventually, many of Mossadegh's firmest supporters refused to countenance his apathetic handling of the spreading disorders. His own people realized that, intentionally or unwittingly, he was handing over the country to the Communists.
On Mossadegh's "supposed anti-foreign attitude":
At that time our Parliament was governed by a troublesome rule which required a two-thirds quorom for conducting any business and a three-fourths quorom for voting on legislation. Taking advantage of this rule, a minority bloc of some forty members regularly deadlocked Parliament by absenting themselves and preventing the necessary quorom. Mossadegh was in charge of these obstructionists.
Becoming thoroughly tired of such unpatriotic actions, I summoned Mossadegh and his minority group for an audience. I asked Mossadegh why he and his people were sabotaging the Government. To my astonishment he replied that it was because the Russians didn't approve of our then Prime Minister. I asked him why in these matters he shouls conduct himself just to please the Russians. Suppose, I said, it were some small power who objected to our Prime Minister - would Mossadegh oblige that power in the same way? Mossadegh had no answer.
Oil:
Meantime American and British oil companies had been interested in obtaining additional oil rights in southern Iran, and the Soviet Union had demanded a concession in the north. Mossadegh considerably enhanced his prestige when, in 1944, Parliament passed his bill forbidding the Government to negotiate any oil concesion without Parliament's approval. The bill was a timely one, but it again illustrates Mossadegh's preoccupation with negative action.
The National Front group:
After the war Mossadegh busied himself with organizing a group of extreme so-called nationalists known as the National Front. He attracted a varied assortment of follwers, including some religious fanatics, students, bazaar merchants, and socialists. Superficially, these groups were bound together by a common hatred of foreigners and foreign influence. They readily co-operated on negative anti-foreign programmes; but later, when they could no longer evade the nation's need for some positive and constructive action, the coalition was doomed to fall apart.
Years leading to the nationalization of oil:
By ignoring our protests the company was systematically imperilling its huge investment in Iran; and the British Government, which might have prevailed upon the company to follow a saner course, failed to sway it. The company and the Government both fanned the fires of Iranian nationalism and strengthened Mossadegh's demagogic hold over the people. He and his National Front began to agitate in favour of nationalizing the oil industry.
Prime Minister Razmara opposed this, hoping for an amicable settlement. Mossadegh and his followers then launched wild demonstrations against the Prime Minister and the foreigners. On 7 March, 1951, a member of the Crusaders of Islam, one of the xenophobic groups supporting Mossadegh, foully murdered the Prime Minister while he was attending a ceremony in a mosque.
Only a few days later Parliament overwhelmingly passed a bill, which I fully endorsed, nationalizing the oil industry.
Mossadegh being appointed Prime Minister:
Mossadegh had already promised the people a new era of prosperity and plenty, to be financed by the oil revenues to which Iran was legitimately entitled. He shouted that he would wring £300,000- nearly $1 million - a day from the company. In fact, how could anyone be against Mossadegh? He would enrich everybody, he would fight the foreigner, he would secure our rights. No wonder students, intellectuals, people from all walks of life, flocked to his banner.
With such promises Mossadegh carried everything before him, and Mr Ala was forces out after less than two months in office. I appointed Mossadegh in his place; at that moment no one could stand against him.
Mossadegh's tenure:
Mossadegh might have shown equal firmness in seeking a constructive oil settlement, but instead he let the oil company call the tune. He spent his entire tenure of office fighting the company in an amateur fashion and regardless of the effects upon his country. When he was deposed he was no nearer a settlement maintaining our rights than when he had started. The United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the Wourld Court, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and numerous other agencies and officials tried to help bring about an understanding, but to no avail. A prisoner of his advisers and even more of his own stubborn self, Mossadegh let his negative emotionalism rule out any chance of agreement. Instead of spending his time on reform and reconstruction, he devoted himself to bickering. We shall see later the lenghts he was ready to go in order to stay in power.
Mossadegh & Oil:
Mossadegh's second big miscalculation lay in his stubborn insistence that he knew how to market our oil with no help from the foreigners. Yet at that time we possessed not a single tanker, nor did we have even the beginnings of an international marketing organization.
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Think of the economic miseries and the political perils that the people of my country would have been spared if Mossadegh had been willing to enter into rational negotiations. I still fondly imagine that, in spite of his disastrous stubborness, he at least had some desire to reach an agreement; but in the case of some of his advisers I am sceptical. I suspect that some of them fervently hoped there would be no settlement; for that would mean economic collapse and, in turn, the imposition of alien political control. That type of perverted nationalism I shall discuss in the next chapter.
Shahanshah Aryamehr includes this letter from Mossadegh sent from NY, and puts in question the "sincerity of his sentiments". Ultimately he leaves the reader to judge for himself in light of events that would happen afterwards:
New York, 21 October, 1951
To His Imperial Majesty, Tehran.
I received your Imperial Majesty's cable which was a great honour and a source of great joy to me. I always pray God to bless his Imperial Majesty with health, a long life, and ever-increasing success. I would like to state that all our successes wherever and in whatever connection they are obtained are due to your Imperial Majesty's attentions and assistance in always strengthening and guiding the Government. As your Imperial Majesty has already been informed by his Excellency the Minister of Court I am leaving for Philadelphia on Monday and for Washington on Tuesday morning wherefrom I shall report to your Imperial Majesty. I would like to ask permission to express once again my gratitude for the assistance and attentions of my noble Emperor.
Dr Mossadegh
13 July 1952 (Mossadegh is the Prime Minister of Iran at this time):
...he stated that he could not continue in that post unless he received extraordinary powers. Apprehensive because of rising Parliamentary and public opposition to his policies, he demanded authority to govern for six months without recourse to Parliament. He also declared that he must assume the post of Minister of War, a position which he hoped would enable him to undermine my power, provided in our Constitution, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
I refused these demands because I was certain that they would lead to further Communist infiltration. As you will see, I was to be proved right. On 17 July I accepted Mossadegh's resignation. Against my better judgement I appointed Ahmad Qavam, who had earlier served in the same post, as Prime Minsiter; some circles thought he could take a strong stand against the leftists.
Immidietely the Tudeh party, joined by Mossadegh's people launched riots and demonstrations. Mob rule prevailed, and Qavam's government seemed powerless to cope with it. Qavam in fact inflamed the situation by making a broadcast in which he sought to contradict the strong popular sentiment for oil nationalization.
President Eisenhower had now taken office, and he and Churchill made further proposals for settling the dispute in order to restore the flow of oil and oil revenues; but Mossadegh rejected these proposals as he had all previous ones.
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Again it was clear that no one could stand against Mossadegh. On 22 July, 1952, the danger of civil war forced me to agree to his conditions and re-appoint him.
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On 30 August, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill sent a joint note to Mossadegh outlining a broad formula for settling the oil dispute. Mossadegh rejected the proposals, and on 22 October he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.
During all this period, the great works at Abadan - both then and now the world's largest refinery - remained virtually idle, and Iran received no royalties. Mossadegh tried to sell oil to small foreign companies that were willing to run the risk of legal claims against them by the British for dealing in allegedly stolen property; but the total sales from these attempts brought in less income than one day's royalties in the period when the refinery had been running full blast.
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...in January 1953, granted Mossadegh an extension of his emergency powers. I wanted to give him every opportunity to develop a constructive oil policy.
Unfortunately, from then on Mossadegh found these powers more and more convenient to his personal ambitions. He muzzled the Press and arrested newspaper editors. Because some of its members now had the courage to criticize him, Mossadegh reduced the National Assembly to impotence, not only by relying on his plenary powers but also by ordering his followers to stay away from the Assembly, thus depriving it of a quorum. Dissenting legislators were also threatened in their homes and on the streets by Mossadegh's hoodlums.
Mossadegh who had always preached about the danger of depreciating currency, did that very thing when he printed paper money of a nominal value of millions of dollars, without any increase in the gold or foreign exchange backing of the currency. He appointed military commanders personally loyal to him, and he allowed - many would say encouraged - the further infiltration of the army by Tudeh Communists. He extended martial law. He had Parliament set up a seven-man committee of his henchmen to study ways and means of curtailing my powers as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
On Mossadegh using the extraordinary powers given to him:
Mossadegh dissolved the Supreme Court. He suspended elections for the National Assembly. Further angered because some members of the latter body have been brave enough to oppose him, he announced a national referendum to decide if the current National Assembly should be dissolved.
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Abd fir tge referendum Mossadegh, the great champion of free elections, arranged that those in favour of dissolution and those against it should vote in seperate plainly-marked booths! Everyone understood that if a man had the courage to vote against dissolution he would probably be beaten up by Mossadegh's toughs or by those of the Tudeh - actually the two groups by this time were almost indistinguishable.
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Dissolution won by over 99 per cent of all votes cast. In one provincial ton where the entire population was about 3,000 people, 18,000 votes were announced as favouring dissolution. Both in that and in other towns, it seems that the dead had voted!
During all his years in Parliament, Mossadegh had posed as a champion of constitutional principles, representative government and due process of law. He had railed against the idea of martial law and had eulogized free elections and freedom of the press.
But now Mossadegh had in a few months abolished the Senate, dissolved the highest court of the land, and claimed a mandate from the people to eliminate the National Assembly. He had stiffled the Press, in effect abolished free elections, extended martial law, and tried his best to weaken my constitutional position. What had become of our hard-won Constitution of 1906?
Mossadegh suggesting the Shah leave the country for a while:
As the threat to the dynasty incrased, I also watched Mossadegh's progressive surrender to the agents of a foreign ideology; and my heart burned within me. In February 1953 he suggested that I temporarily leave the country. In order to give him a free hand to try out his policies, and to have a little respite from his intrigues, I agreed. He proposed that we should keep the plan a close secret, and said he would arrange for Fatemi, his Foreign Minister, personally to issue the necessary travel documents for me, my wife, and our entourage.
Amsingly enough, Mossadegh advised against our leaving by air; with more than usual acumen he remarked that crowds of people opposed to my departure might block the airport runway and prevent the plane from takin off. He proposed that instead we should travel incognito to the frontier and thence through Iraq to Beirut. I agreed.
But somehow the people had learned the secret of our planned departure. The ensuing mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for the time being. The Tudeh party, no doubts in consultation with some of Mossadegh's followers, immidiately called for a united front against the monarchy, but this only seemed to rally the Persian people in support of me and of the position I symbolized.
In retrospect I realized that my decision to leave may have been a hasty one and indeed a big mistake on my part; but God had turned it into a stroke of good fortune.
1953
By mid-1953 there was apparent a definite change in the temper of the nation. Many of Mossadegh's followers had deserted him. They saw that his anti-foreign policy had in actual practice become selective; the real objective was apparently to throw out the British but let in the Reds. The march of events forced upon the people the alarming realization that the country was sliding, not gradually but at breakneck speed, towards political and economic ruin.
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Many religious leaders, students, and merchants, whom he had formerly numbered among his supporters, now turned against him.
On the overthrow of Mossadegh by Iranians:
Mossadegh had reinforced the armoured and other forces guarding his house in Tehran, but he had withdrawn most of the tanks which stood watch around my summer palace at Saadabad where Queen Soraya and I were then staying. In fact twelve U.S.-built medium tanks now guarded his house while the large Saadabad estate, protected by only four tanks, was plainly vulnerable to Tudeh attacks.
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On 13 August, 1953, at Ramsar, I signed decrees dismissing Mossadegh as Prime Minister and naming General Fazlollah Zahedi in his place. To Colonel Nematollah Nassiry, commander of the Imperial Guard, I assigned the ticklish task of delivering the decrees.
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...Colonel Nassiry first set out to deliver my order addressed to General Zahedi. I should record that General Zahedi had been a close associate of Mossadegh, and had in fact served for a while as his Minister of the Interior. Earlier he had been Chief of Police in Razmara's Government and had helped re-elect Mossadegh to Parliament. The General was known to be in the vicinity of Tehran, but his exact whereabouts were a closely guarded secret, divulged only to a handful of trusted associates. Actually, General Zahedi usually remained no more than a day or so at any given address. Because he had fearlessly criticized Mossadegh's methods, he had been obliged to seek sanctuary in the Parliament buildings, and later was forced into hiding. Under cover of darkness he would move on to a different place to escape capture or death.
Colonel Nassiry, aided by intermediaries, found General Zahedi and delivered my order to him. The General agreed to shoulder the job.
Colonel Nassiry now prepared to deliver my order to Mossadegh. First, on General Zahedi's order, Colonel Nassiry arrested three of Mossadegh's closest advisers from whom we gained some indications of Mossadegh's probable attitude. General Zahedi warned Colonel Nassiry if possible to deliver my order to Mossadegh personally, to forestall probable denial of its receipt. I had earlier instructed Colonel Nassiry to see that no harm came to Mossadegh.
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Approaching Mossadegh's house, they found it surrounded by tanks and troops. These forces had been instructed not to allow troops of the Imperial Guard to approach the house in any circumstances. Ignoring this order, Colonel Nassiry and his two officers cooly walked past the muzzles of tank cannon right to Mossadegh's front door.
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Recognizing Mossadegh's handwriting, he knew that the receipt was genuine. It was now about 1 A.M.
But before Colonel Nassiry could withdraw from the house, he was informed that General Riahi, the chief of the army's general staff under Mossadegh, had ordered him to be brought to his office a few blocks away. Colonel Nassiry though this would provide a good opportunity to inform General Riahi that the latter was out of a job.
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As the door opened, General Riahi was in the act of removing an automatic pistol from his desk frawer and concealing it behing his back.
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General Riahi accused Colonel Nassiry of acting in a barbaric manner by planning a coup d'ètat. Colonel Nassiry replied that he had merely been delivering my order to Mossadegh.
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He told the Colonel that from that moment he was a prisoner, and shortly afterwards he was stripped of his uniform and put behind bars.
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The next morning the army's Judge Advocate General, naturally a Mossadegh appointee, interrogated Colonel Nassiry. He charged that I had never issued an order dismissing Mossadegh, and that the Colonel had forged the document. Colonel Nassiry unfolded the smuggled newspaper. The interrogation ceased. [My note: The newspaper contained the order by His Imperial Majesty to dismiss Mossadegh]
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The people, the ordinary people of my country - unarmed or carrying only sticks - had stormed the prison. The guards had ordered them to halt but they had pressed on. The guards then had opened fire, but still they came. An old lady and a number of young people had been shot dead and many others wounded. The guards had then fled.
In the prison courtyard Colonel Nassiry witnessed a scene of joy and exultation. Hundreds of prisoners, loyal to me and incarcerated by Mossadegh, had been released and the people were escorting them to freedom. When they spied General Batmangelich, whom I had appointed as General Riahi's successor but whom Mossadegh had imprisoned, they raised him on their shoulders and carried him in triumph down the street to his office. Thus the people expressed not only their loyalty to me but their joy at beeing freed of Tudeh and Mossadegh terrorism. Mossadegh's General Riahi had already fled.
The text continues to elaborate on how officers and ordinary people continued to free imprisoned officers. Armoured forces under Mossadegh opened fire on advancing crowds who didn't seem to care! There are many caualties and the Colonel narrates the story of a Mossadegh commander being disarmed by civilians as he was arguing with an officers asking for his weapon. The final strike is against Mossadegh's house which is literally a fortress surrounded by tanks and troops. Ordinary people, police, students, soldeirs, artisans...proceed the last blow against the last remaining forces of Mossadegh.
On bravery of ordinary citizens:
On the streets to the east, the populace were attacking Mossadegh's well-emplaced infantry, and on every brave woman was exhorting the people to advance. She cried out to them that she was only a woman, but if they were men they would charge the defenders. The attackers in spite of many casualties did push on until Mossadegh's infantry became demoralized.
Now that's what I call a Sheerzan-e Irani! Not a half-breed arabo-muslim God knows what under a chador (tent) attending friday night prayers at a mosque and sharing a husband with 4 other wives!!!!
On the success of the "revolution":
General Zahedi had originally planned to go to Isfahan to marshal forces there, and he had arranged for other loyal troops to advance towards Teheran from Kermanshah. But, first in our city of Resht and then in dozens of other towns and cities across the land, the ordinary people had already taken matters into their own hands.
So General Zahedi instead climbed aboard a tank, sent by the revolutionaries to the house where he was hidden, and started for the Teheran radio station. But again the populace preceded him. Aided by hundreds of taxi and bus drivers, a long column had already reached the outskirts of the city and had captured the station. Mossadegh's men taken by surprise, had little time to sabotage the transmitters before they fled. The equipment was soon repaired and over the radio the new Prime Minister declared the success of the revolution.
However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Teheran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiancies, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion. This while I was absent from the scene we would in effect have a real referendum - one in which dead people would not vote.
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On 22 August, 1953, three days after General Zahedi had assumed control, I returned to Teheran and to a heart-warming, tumultous welcome. I was greatly moved and touched by this expression of affection, a spontaneous ovation in such contrast to the regimented demonstrations in which Mossadegh and the Tudeh party had excelled.
The trials which followed illuminated some shadowy operations of the Mossadegh period. When Mossadegh became Minister of War in 1952, our armed forces contained about one hundred officers who were members of the Tudeh party. In the period of only about a year before his final downfall, this subversive group had increased to over six hundred; even the commander of the most trusted battalion of my Imperial Guard was a hard-core Communist. The testimony of these men revealed their plan to kill Mossadegh as soon as he had overthrown the Pahlavi dynasty, then to establush their own Communist regime following the pattern in other countries.
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Aided by the Communists, Hossein Fatemi, Mossadegh's Foreign Minister, remained in hiding for seven months. When he was caught we had to give him strong police protection so that he would not be killed on the spot by the people. He was later tried and executed for treason. Mossadegh and the remaining members of his cabinet were also tried, and most of them imprisoned; all are now free. A number of Tudeh party members, including those who had tortured and murdered non-Communist citizens, were executed or imprisoned. I later extended clemency to those among the prisoners who had showed a clear desire to become loyal citizens. Such ex-Tudeh members are not permitted to hold regular government posts, but the Government does help them find other employment; for example a number of them are now working for our semi-autonomous Plan Organization.
On American and British involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh:
The Free World felt deeply concerned over the crisis that developed in my country prior to the fall of Mossadegh and his Tudeh allies. I have, therefore, sometimes been asked if America or Britain helped finance the movement that overthrew Mossadegh. Of course it was well known that a foreign power helped establish the Tudeh party, and that from the beginning it was aided with foreign funds; so it was easy to believe that those who were opposed to the Tudeh and to Mossadegh were also subsidized. Rumours flow unusually freely in my country, and one had it that ordinary people who rose against Mossadegh in some instances received American dollars or (according to another version) British pounds for their help.
Although I was abroad at the climax of the uprising, I was in constant touch with the situation during those days, and of course lived with it before and after my short absence. I do not deny that payments could in some cases conceivably have been made. I frankly have no firm evidence either way. But I think this is certainly true: it takes much more than money to impel people to do what Iran's loyal citizens did during those days. In overturning Mossadegh and the Tudeh, they staged a revolution that was inspired by indigenous nationalism. I have told how many of them advanced unarmed against the fire of tanks and machine-guns. Women and children as well as men gave up their lives in that way. I doubt if those brave people expected or received payment for their patriotism. I credit them with ideals of a nobler sort.
Besides, it always amazed me that some who talked most loudly about alleged foreign payments seemed to have no objection to them when they came from Communist sources. What kind of hypocrisy is that? How many are fooled by it?
When Prime Minister Zahedi took office, he immediately set about putting Iran's house in order. The Government was by this time virtually bankrupt. In September 1953 President Eisenhower announced an immediate allocaton of $45 million in emergency economic aid (as distinguished from Point Four help) to make up deficits in our Government's budget. Economic aid to support the budget averaged about $5 million a month for the three years following Mossadegh's fall.
Prime Minister Zahedi dealing with nation's leftover problems from Mossadegh time in office:
Iran's budgetary plight arose mainly, of course, from the continued stagnation of the oil industry under Mossadegh. Prime Minister Zahedi, moving to get the oil flowing again, first re-established diplomatic relations with Great Britain; some extremists criticized this move. Negotiations were then opened for the creation of an international consortium which would take the place of the all-British company. American, British, French, and Dutch companies eventually joined together for this purpose, and in September 1954, a final agreement was drawn up. In the following month Parliament ratified the agreement, I approved it, and tankers began to load at the ports serving the great refinery at Abadan. With the revenue from oil sales, plus the generous American help I mentioned, Iran's development programme was resumed.
Concluding:
Yet in a strange way Mossadegh filled a temporary need. In my country after the Second World War, circumstances almost seemed to demand a person of Mossadegh's irrational, emotional temperament. After the chaos of the war and domination by foreigners in our midst, we in Iran felt a resurgence of nationalistic fervour. We were in the irrational phase, and you could discern in Iran during those years the same immature nationalism to be seen elsewhere today. In fact, if you want to understand the real meaning of the new wave of nationalism that is now sweeping over some countries you can do no better than to look at Iran in Mossadegh's time.
Mossadegh showed no diffidence about accepting the role that events thrust upon him. As Prime Minister he raved, he ranted, he wept, he fainted, he wore his famous pyjamas at public meetings. On the slightest provocation he feigned illness and took to his bed.
I remember that on one occasion Mossadegh swooned in the midst of a speech to our Parliament. When a hastily summoned doctor started to loosen his clothes, Mossadegh instantly revived enough to clap his hand over his wallet. The old hypocrite had not been unconscious at all; he was merely pretending in the hope of impressing his audience.
I think this incident, observed by many, illustrates cardinal characteristics - namely, his insincerity. I am sorry to have to say that Mossadegh did not merit the confidence of those who thought he was honest; for gross insincerity in a man deprives him of any right to be called honest in the broader sense of that term. Those who knew him at close range, as I did, will long remember Mossadegh with pity as somebody who lacked integrity as well as manliness and statesmanship. His three main charactersitics were his negativism, his hyocrisy, and his egotism.
In the beginning he had served his country well. In his negative way he had crystallized our people's anti-foreign sentiments; with his own interests at heart he had jumped on the bandwagon of xenophobia. Oddly enough, his real usefulness to the country ended with his appointment as Prime Minister.
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Mossadegh, let us hope unintentionally, betrayed the common people of Iran by promising them a better deal and then sabotaging his own promises.
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While Mossadegh was Prime Minister, his colleagues in other oil-producing countries were using oil to finance national development. Mossadegh did nothing. His own obtuse stubborness ( for which he was known long before he came to power), his own pshychological need to be forever in the limelight, prevailed at the expense of his country and of those who sought to serve it loyally.
When we later reached an oil settlement, we did it strictly within the terms of the nationalization law. Some of Mossadegh's apologists went out of their way to overlook that point. We reached agreement under the terms of the same law that was already in force when Mossadegh came to power. Later we went on to make other contracts that opened a whole new era in the relations between oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.
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Possession of power tests a man. Some men rise to its moral challenge and become greater; others become smaller. Tested by the results of his possession of power, Mossadegh became a very small man indeed.
Every country makes mistakes. If the Mossadegh experiment taught us how not to run a country, perhaps in the long run it will have proved worth while. On 19 August each year, my country celebrates Nation Day, commemorating the fall of Mossadegh and the routing of alien forces that came within a hair's breadth of extinguishing our independence. I hope we never forget its significance.
Picture below is of Mossadegh with a Soviet official if i'm not mistaken:
Dr Yazdi, Tudeh Party leader; arrested by Imperial troops in 1953 after the fall of Mossadegh
Not sure if this is General Batmangelich:
Mossadegh kissing Queen Soraya's hand:
Mossadegh during his trial. Sitting next to his legal aide Colonel Shahgholi: