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Pan Turanianism
Takes Aim at Azerbaijan
A Geopolitical Agenda
Dr. Kaveh Farrokh
Manuvera@aol.com
Part
Two
Chapter
Two: Pan Turanian Claims to Azerbaijan
Chapter
Two: Pan Turanian Claims to Azerbaijan
Azerbaijanis
have always been vigorously active in the political, cultural,
linguistic, and commercial domains of Persia. Turkish, spoken
by the majority of Iran's Azerbaijani populace, is one of the
many languages of Iran's multi-ethnic populace. Turkish can be
heard not only in Tabriz, but in many rural and metropolitan parts
of Iran, especially in Tehran.
In my visit to Tehran a few years ago, I recall the cab driver
asking me what music I wanted to hear in his car: "Sir are
you in the mood for Turkish music?...I also have the latest from
Ercan from Istanbul
or are you in the mood for Persian? On
that note, how about some Luri or Kurdish?"
This tiny
example neatly encapsulates what Persia has always been about
since its founding by Cyrus the great. Persia is not confined
by linear conceptions such as "race", "language"
or even "culture". An Iranian can just as easily be
speaking Arabic in Khuzistan, Baluchi in Zahedan, or Turkish in
Maragheh. It is this Persia that certain opportunistic and naïve
individuals and organizations believe they can destroy, and the
main tool they have been using is "language and cultural
rights" (Part VI, item 10). There is a distinction between
legitimate rights (e.g. language, cultural expression, theology,
etc.) versus entities who deceptively appropriate these "rights"
to mask a divisive and potentially violent agenda.
The pan-Turanian
theories discussed in Part I represent only a part of the picture.
There is a whole set of beliefs being narrated about Iranian Azerbaijan
in both the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Turkish Republic. They
are using the Turkish language as an instrument to differentiate
Iranian Turcophones from the rest of Iran. Some of the pan-Turanian
claims to Iranian Azerbaijan can be summarized into the following:
(1)
Greater Azerbaijan was divided between Russia and Persia.
(2)
Azerbaijanis have spoken Turkish since the advent of History.
(3)
Turks have been in the Caucasus for over 5000 Years.
(4)
The Safavid Empire was Turkish.
(5)
Sattar Khan was a pan-Turanian separatist.
(6)
Babak Khorramdin was a Turk who fought against Persia.
(7)
Azerbaijanis and all who speak Turkish are Turkish by race.
Before discussing
these items, an important point must be revisited. Pan-Turanian
claims to Azerbaijan are supported by a very powerful western
lobby in the form of multinational and geopolitical petroleum
interests. These hope to access and dominate the lucrative oil
bonanza looming in the energy deposits of the Caucasus and Central
Asia (see Part VI, items 1-3).
(1)
Greater Azerbaijan was divided between Russia and Persia.
This is the
belief that there was an independent kingdom by the name of "Azerbaijan"
(encompassing Arran and Iranian Azerbaijan). This "kingdom"
is then claimed to have been partitioned between Qajar Iran and
Tsarist Russia in the treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkemenchai
(1827); leading to the creation of a Russian occupied North Azerbaijan
and Iranian occupied South Azerbaijan. This account is a fictional
narrative at best, and a gross distortion of historical events.
(a)
Arran & the Historical Azerbaijan. The first recorded reference
to Azerbaijan can be traced to Aturpat [i] , the local Iranian
commander of the region at the time of Alexander the Great's conquest
of Persia in 333 BC. Aturpat is Old Persian for "guardian/keeper"
(pat/bad) of the "fire" (Atur) [ii] . The region of
Aturpat, was known in Old Persian as Aturpatkan [iii] ("The
place of the Guardian/keeper of the fire"). The region was
known as such until the Arab conquests of Persia in the 7th century
AD [iv] . After the battle of Nahavand, the Arabs broke through
the Malayir plains of northwest Iran in 642 AD and into Aturpatkan.
The region was henceforth referred to by its Arabic pronunciation,
Azerbaijan.
Historical
sources have clearly delineated the historical Azerbaijan as having
been situated between the Daylamites of Northern Persia to their
east, with the Araxes River as its northernmost limit. The region
north/northeast of the Araxes River was known as Arran. This region
was variously known as Ardan by the Parthians, as well as Alban/Albania
as per the Caucasian designation. Armenian historians cite the
region north of the Araxes as "Agvan", "Agvanak",
"Alvan" or "Alvanak". The region above the
Araxes River has never been known as "Azerbaijan". Professors
Touraj Atabaki and Jalal Matini (see References) have listed numerous
primary historical sources that provide indisputable evidence
of the clear delineation between Arran/Albania and the historical
Azerbaijan in Iran. A handful of these include:
Strabo (64/63
BC-23 AD): Cites the people of Iranian Azerbaijan (known as Media
Atropatene at the time of Strabo) as Iranians and with Persian
as their language [v] . The "Persian" cited by Strabo
would have most likely been of the Parthian Pahlavi variety at
the time.
Arrian (92-c.
175 AD): The region north of the Araxes River is cited as "Albania"
and south of the Araxes as "Media Atropatene".
The Hodud-ol-Alam
Text (10th century AD): Cites the Araxes River as the northern
limit of Azerbaijan.
Ibn-Hawqal:
Cites the Araxes River as the southern limit of Arran.
Al-Muqaddasi
(10th Century AD): Divided Persia into eight regions which include
both Azerbaijan and Arran. Defines Arran as being situated between
the Caspian Sea and the Araxes River.
Yaqut Al-Hamavi
(13th Century AD): Defines Arran and Azerbaijan as distinct territories
with the Araxes River forming the boundary between them. Arran
defined as north and west of the Araxes, with Azerbaijan to the
south of the River.
Borhan-e-Qate
(Completed 1632 AD): Aras (Araxes) defined as a river flowing
past Tbilisi in Georgia and forming the boundary between Arran
and Azerbaijan.
Sassanian emperor, Shapur I (r. 241-270 AD), cited Albania and
Media Atropatene as two separate provinces of the Persian Empire.
Professor Mark Whittow's map of Oxford University (see references
- see also item 6) clearly shows the historically attested distinction
between ancient Arran/Albania and the original Azerbaijan in Iran
(see below):

Arran Map
Note how the
Araxes River separates Arran from the historical Azerbaijan (in
Iran). It is interesting that virtually no maps such as these
are ever discussed by pan-Turanian activists (and their western
supporters) seeking to incite anti-Persian sentiments among Iranian
Azerbaijanis. Even less acknowledged is the strong Armenian presence
in historical Albania/Arran, especially west of the River Kur/Kura.
(b) The
Musavats and the early Pan-Turanianists. The Islamic Democratic
Musavat Party (IDMP) was established in the city of Baku in Arran
in 1911 [vi] . Although nominally a pan-Islamic movement for the
Caucasus, the IDMP was in fact a pan-Turanian movement with an
Islamic flavour. The IDMP wanted to use Islam to target Turkish
speakers of the Caucasus (Arran in particular) and Azerbaijan
in Iran [vii] . In practice, the Musavats catered to the pan-Turanian
elements of the Ottoman Empire [viii] who endeavoured to create
a Turkish super-state stretching from Central Asia to the Aegean
Sea [ix] .
The collapse
of the Czarist Russian Empire by 1917 was the catalyst for the
breaking away of many of Russia's conquests of former Persian
territory in the Caucasus. This resulted in the Musavats solidifying
their ties to The Turkish Federalist Party in the Ottoman Empire
by June 1917 [x] . By November 1917, the first Musavat congress
was inaugurated in the Caucasus (Arran?), after which the party
was renamed as the Turkish Democratic Musavat Party (TDMP) [xi]
. The full tilt of the Musavat party to pan-Turanianism was now
evident.
By April 22,
1918, a political coalition of Mensheviks (Georgians), Dashnakists
(Armenians) and TDMP (Turkish speaking as well some non-Turkish
Muslims from the Caucasus), officially proclaimed the inauguration
of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic. However on 26 May 1918,
the Republic was dissolved with the Georgian Mensheviks proclaiming
their own republic on the same day, with the Armenian Dashnakists
doing the same two days later. The TDMP met on May 27 1918 in
Tbilisi and selected the name of "Azerbaijan", rather
than Albania or Arran, as the title of their new "Independent
Republic of Azerbaijan" (IRA) [xii] . The main proponents
of this name change were local Turkish and non-Turkish Muslim
elites [xiii] as well as Ottoman pan-Turanian activists [xiv]
, many of them Ottoman officers who had recently fought against
the Russians in the Caucasus with success [xv] (see photo of Ottoman
officers campaigning in the Caucasus in World War One - see Nicolle
in references).

Musavat
It is worth
noting that Nuri Pashi, a brother of Enver Pasha, also volunteered
and fought against the Imperial Russians in the Caucasus during
the First World War.
The main objective
of "borrowing" Azerbaijan's name and applying it to
Arran was to create the illusion of a formerly "united"
Azerbaijan that was divided in two by Persia and Russia. As the
majority of the inhabitants of Arran and Azerbaijan speak Turkish
and have family ties in both regions, the fiction of an "independent
state" that was "divided" rapidly gained hold in
former Arran.
The pan-Turanian
activists first applied the name of Iran's Azerbaijan to a former
Iranian province (Arran) then proposed to annex the real Azerbaijan
(in Iran) into their newly born republic [xvi] . Even more amazing
is how quickly the pan-Turanian ideologues of the Musavats began
to believe their own propaganda. One example is Nasib Bey Ussubekov
(a Musavat activist and one of the leaders of the republic in
1918) who made it clear that he regarded Iranian Azerbaijan as
a part of the newly invented "Independent Republic of Azerbaijan".
Czarist and
Soviet Russia did much to advance the cause pan-Turanianism, a
fact undoubtedly rejected by pan-Turanian and Russian scholars
alike. Despite the fact that the Russians and Turks have fought
several long and bloody wars against each other in history, the
two powers have at times cooperated against Persia. This is noted
by Professor Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh:
"The
Russo-Ottoman agreement of 1724
conspired to dismember
Iran
after the fall of the Safavid Empire, and to divide its territories
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires"
[Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players of the Great Game, 2004,
p.15].
Both powers were forced to evacuate Persia by Nader Shah Afshar
(1688-1747) (see photo below - further discussion item 2c).

Nader Shah
(c) The
Soviet Russians & Joseph Stalin. The Independent Republic
of Azerbaijan was dismantled and overthrown by Soviet Russian
forces on April 28th, 1920, immediately after which Arran once
again became a part of the Russian empire [xvii] . Interestingly,
the Russians decided to retain the pan-Turanian invention for
Arran, and began to refer to Arran as "The Soviet Republic
of Azerbaijan".
A quick study
of rare historical archives reveals a very cynically self-serving
(and an unintentionally pan-Turanian) Russian approach to the
Arran affair:
"The
name "Azerbaijan" for the Republic of Azerbaijan (Soviet
Azerbaijan) was selected on the assumption that the stationing
of such as republic would lead to that entity Iranian to become
one
this is the reason why the name "Azerbaijan"
was selected (for Arran)
anytime when it is necessary to
select a name that refers to the territory of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, we should/can select the name Arran
"
Quote from
Bartold, Soviet academic, politician and foreign office official.
See Bartold, V.V., Sochineniia, Tom II, Chast I, Izdatelstvo Vostochnoi
Literary, p.217, 1963.
This was a
brilliant geopolitical move, as it now allowed for Russia, like
the Ottoman Turks before them, to eventually make a grab for Iranian
Azerbaijan. It is very likely that Joseph (Iosef) Stalin (born
Djugashvilii - his mother was Ossetian) (see photo below) was
complicit in this action. Stalin deliberately and repeatedly referred
to many famous Iranian literary figures (such as Nizami, Ganji,
Shabestari, etc.) as "great national Azerbaijani literary
figures", with no mention of their association and origins
in Persia.

Stalin
Stalin's tactic
was to lump all historical figures and references from Arran and
Azerbaijan as "Azerbaijanis", pretending that these
were never distinct provinces of Persia, and that neither had
any cultural, linguistic or historical association with Persia.
Stalin specifically
worked at removing pre-communist (Tsarist) archives that referred
to the historical designations of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
This included the Russian language "Russian Encyclopedia"
(printed in 1890, St. Petersburg & Leipzig, Imperial Germany
- see Matini, 1989, p.455 in References) which clearly distinguished
Albania/Arran from Azerbaijan in Iran.
It was Stalin
who encouraged the museums and maps of the Soviet Republic of
Azerbaijan to refer to Azerbaijani cities in the Soviet Union
and Iran as if they were one province. Stalin wanted no distinctions
made between former Arran (Soviet Azerbaijan) and historical Azerbaijan
(in Iran). He instructed his hand-picked historians (both in Soviet
Azerbaijan and Russia) to revise the entire history of Arran and
its association with Persia, and to blur Arran's distinction from
the historical Azerbaijan of Iran (recall the quote from Bartold
we cited previously).
By 1937, Soviet
"Anthropologists" formally coined the ethnic name of
"Azeris" to the Albanians/Arranis. These were published
as azerbaidzantsi in Russian and rapidly translated by the Soviets
to azarbaycanli, in Turkish. Stalin's historians were instructed
to engage in the process of ethno-engineering in which invented
terms were used to de-Persianize those ethnic groups of the USSR
that had long-standing associations with the culture and history
of Persia. This has resulted in generations of people in the Republic
of Azerbaijan being indoctrinated with Stalinist propaganda and
falsified history. Today, a large number of the people of the
Republic of Azerbaijan believe that Iranian Azerbaijan, which
they call "Guney (South) Azerbaijan", is "occupied"
by Iran, and must be "liberated" and "reunited"
with the Republic of Azerbaijan. These false distortions are being
actively promoted among Iranian Azerbaijanis.
It is interesting
that pan-Turanian activists view Russia as an enemy, when Russia,
between 1920-1990, spent much of its time and resources promoting
their cause by directly sponsoring false anti-Persian scholarship
and propaganda, to the benefit of pan-Turanian philosophies. Stalin
supported the writing of the "Vatan Dili" (The Language
of our Motherland), which provided a pan-Turanian version of the
history of "Greater Azerbaijan" (Arran and the historical
Azerbaijan of Iran). The Vatan Dili was specifically written to
excise all references of Iranian Azerbaijan's historical associations
with Persia (e.g. Moses of Dasxuranci's "History of the Caucasian
Albanians" - see references, and item 3 further below).
Soviet ethno-engineers
went much further however. They literally created at least twenty-four
ethnic-territorial designations for numerous "nationalities"
that had never existed before in history. Most of these new "nationalities"
were Turkic (e.g. Buryatia, Yakutia, Kirgiziya). The Soviets administratively
organized a mosaic of distinct Turkic regions in the USSR and
virtually wrote (or invented) histories for each of them. These
actions have been very helpful to pan-Turanian ideologues. Thanks
to Soviet ethnic engineering, pan-Turanian ideologues can now
point to "dozens of Turkish nations" that "must
be united into a single Turan".
(d) Mr. Mohammad
Amin Rasulzadeh. A leading proponent of Arran's name change was
Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh (1884-1955), the first leader of the
newly created Republic of Azerbaijan (see photo below). Rasulzadeh
was of Iranian origin from Baku, and was in fact heavily involved
in the constitutional democratic movement of Iran during the early
1900s [xviii] (see Sattar Khan in item 5).

Amin
Rasulzadeh
was in fact the editor of the newspaper Iran-e-Now (The New Iran).
Russian influence and coercion finally forced the Iranian government
to expel Rasulzadeh from Iran in 1909 (?); he was exiled to Ottoman
Turkey, where the Young Turk movement had gained power.
The Young
Turk movement had a profound psychological influence on Rasulzadeh;
he became ensnared in the embrace of pan-Turanianism. It is noteworthy
that before his conversion to pan-Turaniasm, Rasulzadeh viewed
himself and his native Arran (Albania) in his writings as members
of "Our beloved homeland Iran
" [xix] . By 1913,
the Turanisized Rasulzadeh returned to the Caucasus where he joined
the Musavat Party and became its leader shortly thereafter.
Iranians in
general and Azerbaijani activists in particular, opposed the new
name for Arran (Albania). Azerbaijani political activist Shaikh
Mohammad Khiyabani [xx] (photo below) suggested that Iranian Azerbaijan's
name be changed to "Azadistan" (Land of Freedom) as
to distinguish this from the newly created Soviet Republic of
Azerbaijan [xxi] . The usage of the term "Azerbaijan"
for Arran was also protested by north Iranian (Gilan) activist,
Mirza Kuchek Khan (1880-1921).
Khiyabani
Rasulzadeh
was to admit in 1924 to his former Iranian comrade, Sheikh Hassan
Taqhizadeh (photo below - seated next to him is Seyyed Abolhassan
Alavi) of Tabriz that he wished to do "whatever is in his
power to avoid any further discontent among Iranians" [xxii]
and explicitly admitted that "Albania (present Republic of
Azerbaijan) is different from Azerbaijan (the original Azerbaijan
in Iran)" [xxiii] . Taqhizadeh and Alavi were the publishers
of the popular Kaveh newspaper, named after one of ancient Persia's
semi-mythical heroes.

Taghizadeh - Alavi
By the 1930s,
Rasulzadeh's writings revealed his full conversion to pan-Turanianism:
(a)
At first he admitted that "Azerbaijan" (Arran and Azerbaijan
in Iran?) was an ancient Iranian province that had been linguistically
Turcified since at least the 13th century.
(b)
He then rejected his previous writings and declared that Azerbaijan
(both Arran and Azerbaijan in Iran) had always been "Turkish"
and was never historically an integral part of Persia [xxiv] .
Rasulzadeh
had betrayed his Iranian heritage in two ways. First, he failed
to fulfill his promises to Iranian Azerbaijanis to rectify the
name change he had bought for Arran (at pan-Turanian behest).
Second, Rasulzadeh adopted a false, divisive, and racist ideology.
Rasulzadeh's legacy continues to haunt the Caucasus and Iran to
this day. That legacy has also provided an excellent tool for
geopolitical manipulation.
After his
arrest and expulsion from Russia, Rasulzadeh settled in Turkey,
where he died in 1954 (see his funeral in Turkey below). Rasulzadeh
established the "Azerbaijan National Centre" in Turkey,
a movement which at the time was organized for the purpose of
opposing Soviet rule in Arran (modern Republic of Azerbaijan).
Amin Funeral
(e) The
role of Soviet Russia in 1941-1946. The notion of a "divided
north Azerbaijan versus a south Azerbaijan" was first invented
by Russian historians of the Stalinist Soviet era [xxv] . Russian
troops were in fact occupying Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan
as part of a joint occupation force with the British since 1941
(the Americans came soon after).
As the Tehran
conference of November 29, 1943 was taking place, Stalin (seated
below left, US President Roosevelt in centre, British Prime Minister
Churchill at right), had already planned to set up his puppet
republics in both Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Even before
Britain, Soviet Russia and the USA had signed the Tripartite Treaty,
The US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull (1871-1955) had expressed
his concern for Soviet assistance for separatist movements within
northern Iran - the United States viewed this as alarming at the
time (see Hull in References).

Tehran Conference
Jafar Pishevari
(????-1947) led the separatist "Azerbaijan Autonomous Republic"
(see photo) and Qazi Mohammad (1913-1946) (see photo) the Kurdish
"Republic of Mahabad" during 1945-1946. Both movements
were dependent on the Soviet Union, and collapsed almost immediately
after the Soviet withdrawal in 1946. What is very interesting
is that no pan-Turanian activist (see Chehreganli in item 5a)
make few (if any) references to the fact that both Pishevari and
Mohammad's movements occurred in areas under direct Russian occupation.

Pishevari

Qazi Mohammed
Note the exact
similarity of the uniforms of the Kurdish "martyrs"
to the Russian uniforms of the period. Below is a photo of Kurdish
"martyrs" of the Soviet-supported Mahabad Republic -
compare these to the field cap and uniform (note shoulder epaulettes)
of General Georgi Zhukov (1896-1974) (immediately below the "martyrs"
photo):

Martyers
 
L. General Georgi Zhukov
R. General Georgi Zhukov at the fields
Note again
the exact similarity of the uniforms of the "Azerbaijan Feda-iyan"
led by Gholam Yahya Daneshiyan (see photo below - Daneshiyan stands
at right) to the Russian uniforms of the period. Below right is
a reconstruction of Russian officers in Berlin in 1945; by author
Steven Zaloga and history illustrator Ron Volstad (see references
for details):

Gholam Yahya

Soviets
Despite the
photo's poor quality, Gholam Yahya's uniform is clearly that of
a Junior Lieutenant of the Russian red Army; the two men standing
next to Yahya wear the uniforms and caps of Soviet NKVD officers
(Red Army political/intelligence officers).
Pan-Azeri
separatists also fail to explain why the Pishevari government
collapsed so quickly as Tehran marched in to reclaim its authority.
The Russians, who had been forced by International pressure (mainly
US president Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) - see photo below) to
end their occupation of Northern Persia, had left Pishevari with
a large amount of ammunition and automatic weapons - they had
also turned over to Pishevari much of the heavy equipment they
had captured earlier in 1941 from the Iranian army.

Truman
Even as Russia
reluctantly vacated Iran, she bought Communist activists from
a number of nations (e.g. Anti-Athens Greek Communists) [xxvi]
into Azerbaijan to fight for Pishevari. This was mainly due to
concerns that the vast majority of Azerbaijanis viewed Pishevari
as a Russian stooge and puppet, and would not fight for him. As
their forces rapidly dissolved, Pishevari and his followers fled
to the USSR. In Tabriz, capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, huge crowds
celebrated the departure of Pishevari and his Russian supporters.
These facts are corroborated in excerpts by the aforementioned
Iranian Azerbaijani professor, Touraj Atabaki:
"What
appears to have been much more crucial than "Western pressure"
in
bringing about the downfall of the Azerbaijani Democrats was the
lack of popular (Azerbaijani) support they had to cope
the
speed with which their regime (Pishevari) collapsed
the
virtual absence of any form of popular armed resistance to the
central government's troops
" (p.176).
[Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power
in Iran. Published I.B. Taurus Publishers, 2000]
Even as he
was rejected by the very Azerbaijani people he so passionately
advocated, Mr. Pishevari continued his fantasy of partitioning
Iran as he sat in Baku. It was after his ejection from Iran, that
Pishevari formalized the myth of a "north" and "south"
Azerbaijan (the idea had already been toyed with by Soviet historians
since the 1920s). As noted previously, "North" means
the Republic of Azerbaijan (former Arran) and "South"
is the historical Azerbaijan of Iran.
There are
now vigorous attempts by pan-Turanian activists and their western
sympathizers to virtually ignore any link between Mr. Pishevari
and Communist Russian support for his cause. In the Republic of
Azerbaijan for example, Pishevari is officially presented as a
hero "fighting to liberate the Azeri Turks from the racist
Persians". Sadly, there are now a number of naïve Iranian
Azerbaijanis who officially celebrate Pishevari's birthday. It
would seem that time and historical revisionism has transformed
Mr. Pishevari from Soviet collaborator to legend.
Archival research
again reveals a less flattering image of Mr. Pishevari: a man
with an openly servile attitude towards his Kremlin masters. Note
Mr. Pishevari's telegram to Mr. Mir Jaafar Bagherov, First Secretary
of the Communist Party and Stalin's hand-picked man in Soviet
Azerbaijan:
"Dear
and Kind Father Mir Jaafar Bagherov,
The people
of "south" Azerbaijan who are, beyond any doubt, a part
of "north" Azerbaijan, like all peoples of the world,
have eyed their hopes on the great people of the Soviet Union
and the government of the Soviet Union."
As published
in the Azerbaijan Newspaper, No. 213, Azar 1329 (Iranian chronology),
p.224, in Baku, The Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. This is cited
by Jalal Matini, Azerbaijan Koja Ast? [Where is Azerbaijan?].
Iranshenasi, Volume I, No.3, 1989b, p.458.
Note photo
below of Mr. Pishevari in Baku with the Soviet sponsored Azerbaijan
Newspaper:

Pishevari at Baku
"The
government of the Soviet Union"? The politically embarrassing
Bagherov telegram reveals that Mr. Pishevari was still dreaming
of "heroically" re-entering Iran - riding on the back
of Soviet tanks of course. Thanks to massive funding and propaganda
efforts, some misinformed Azerbaijanis are unaware of this information.
The fact remains that Mr. Pishevari was a stooge of Mr. Joseph
Stalin and his cronies in Moscow.
It is truly
sad to see how misguided Mr. Pishevari was. The story of his demise
however is even more tragic and is being hidden from public knowledge.
"Official" Soviet history has it that Mr. Pishevari
died in hospital and/or as a result of a car accident in Baku.
The real history may be different however.
Although many
of those details remain classified, a Georgian immigrant whose
family had ties to the former Soviet regime (who has asked not
be identified), noted that during his stay in Baku, Mr. Pishevari
began to express doubts as to the wisdom of his actions and even
felt that he had betrayed his nation, Iran. The fear of Pishevari
"coming out" led Bagherov to quickly eliminate Pishevari
before he made any embarrassing public statements. He may either
have been suffocated with a pillow or died in his car as a result
of deliberate mechanical tampering. These details cannot be independently
verified and most likely the entire truth of these final tragic
events will never be known.
One of Stalin's
aims was to use his occupation as leverage to force oil concessions
from the Iranian government at the time. Interestingly, a number
of declassified documents suggest that the British were sympathetic
to the Russians annexing Northern Persia. The British thought
that they should "share" Persia's oil with the Russians.
As noted by Professor Louis:
"There
was a powerful current of (British) Foreign Office thought
that
Anglo-Soviet relations could be improved if it could be demonstrated
to the Russians that the British did not intend to corner all
of the Persian oil resources"
[Louis, Wm., R., The British Empire in the Middle East, 1984,
p.57]
Note the following
statement made by the British Head of the Northern Department
of the Foreign Office, Mr. C.F.A. Warner, at the height of the
Pishevari crisis, where he suggested that the British:
"
look
at the problem from the long-term angle of Anglo-Soviet relations
rather than from the point of view of the feckless Persians".
[Louis, Wm., R., The British Empire in the Middle East, 1984,
p.58]
NOTE: Feckless
generally means having no effect or importance, lacking purpose
or vitality, feeble or ineffective, careless and irresponsible.
Pishevari
was in fact trying to convert regional economic grievances into
a full blown separatist movement - with Russian support. This
is very similar to what is happening today with the geopolitically
sponsored movements such as the United Azerbaijan Movement who
endeavour at creating separatism based on local (mainly economic)
grievances and linguistic differences (item 5a).
(2)
Azerbaijanis have spoken Turkish since the advent of History.
(a) Archival
Information.
Once again,
historical archives contradict pan-Turanian ideology. Note the
following example:
Al-Istakhri
(10th Century AD): Cites people of Azerbaijan speaking both Persian
and Arabic (as would have been the case in the entire Persian
realm stretching to Central Asia at the time of the Caliphates).
The Arranis are mentioned as speaking a different dialect, called
"Arrani" which was different from that spoken by the
Azerbaijanis.
The notion
of Azerbaijanis as never having been part of the Persian nation
linguistically and historically is again dramatically contradicted
by:
Al-Masudi
(10th Century AD): Reported Persians as "a people whose borders
are the Mahat Mountains and Azerbaijan up to Armenia and Arran,
and Baylaqan up to Darband (in the Caucaus), and Rayy and Tabaristan
amd Masqat and Shabaran and Jorgan (Gorgan) and Abarshahr, and
that is Nishabur, and Heart and Merv and other places in the land
of Khorassan, and Sejistan and Kerman and Fars and Ahvaz
all
these lands were one kingdom with one sovereign and one language
the
language differed slightly
such as Pahlavi, Dari, Azeri,
as well as other Persian languages."
The Arrani
dialect mentioned by Al-Istakhri was most likely a transitional
post-Pahlavi language (like modern Kurdish), however it may have
been a derivative of a North Iranian language, such as Ossetian.
Azeri was a Pahalvi based Iranian dialect, and there are unconfirmed
reports of a certain "Fahlavi" dialect that is still
spoken in isolated pockets in Azerbaijan. Most Iranian dialects
were displaced by the migration of Oghuzz Turkic speaking arrivals
to Arran and Azerbaijan from Central Asia, from and after the
11th century.
(b)
The Turkic arrivals & Manzikert. Pockets of Turkish arrivals
to Arran and Azerbaijan are recorded in 1029 and 1044, however
it was in 1054 when the Seljuk Turk warrior chief, Tughrul Beg,
arrived to and received the submission of the local Iranian rulers
of Arran and Azerbaijan. The local Iranian dialects, Azeri in
particular, were gradually replaced by a Turkic language of the
southwest family (Oghuzz). It was Alp Arslan (1029-72) who established
the Seljuk dominion over much of Anatolia, Persia and Mesopotamia
and ensured the legacy of the Turkish language in Azerbaijan and
Arran. Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes IV met Alp Arslan in
the Battle at Manzikert and was defeated and captured by the Seljuks
on August 19 or 26, 1071. A key element in the defeat of the Greeks
was the act of betrayal by Andronicus Ducas, the commander of
Romanus' rearguard. At a crucial moment in the battle, Ducas simply
retired to Constantinople (modern Istanbul), apparently in a short-sighted
and self-serving attempt at enhancing his own political position.
The Manzikert
battle, and Alp Arslan's victory was of immense consequence:
[a]
It was a major factor leading to the crusades,
[b] The
downfall of Constantinople in 1453
[c]
Expansion of subsequent (Ottoman) Turkish power into Central Europe
by the 1600s
[d]
It ensured the survival of Turkish as the main vernacular in Azerbaijan
and Arran
(c) Linguistic
Turkification. The process of linguistic Turkification was reinforced
with the arrival of the Mongols in the 1200s, and their Il-Khanid
dynasty in Persia. Tamerlane's descendants, the Qara/Kara-Qoyunlu
(Black Sheep) and Ak/Aq-Qoyunlu (White Sheep) also ruled Iran.
It must be noted that the Turkish migrants became absorbed into
mainstream Persia, and they greatly patronized Persian, arts,
culture and literature. Turks as whole have been tremendously
influenced by Iranian culture - a prime example is the Moghul
Dynasty of India, of Turkmen-Mongol descent. The Moghuls promoted
Persian culture in India, a legacy which lasts to this day in
modern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
By the early
16th century (see Safavids item 4), Azerbaijani Turkish had largely
replaced the indigenous Iranian Azeri in Azerbaijan and had also
spread to Arran. The Turkish language however, did not alter the
thousands year long Iranian character and legacy of Arran and
Azerbaijan. As noted in item 4, the Safavid dynasty, whose members
spoke Turkish in court and introduced much Turkish vocabulary
to Iran, considered themselves as the heirs of Persia and bitterly
fought the Ottoman Turks throughout their reign.
In Persia,
identity has never been delineated by singular, simplistic and
narrow concepts such as "race", "mother language"
or even "religion". Consider the following examples:
The Buyid
dynasty (945-1055 AD), hailed from the Daylamites of Northern
Persia who spoke a post-Sassanian Pahlavi dialect. Note illustration
of a Dailamite female governess/warrior of Rayy (near modern Tehran):

Banu of Rayy
The aforementioned
Nader Shah was an ethnic Turcomen and adhered to the Sunni branch
of Islam. Karim Khan Zand (1705-1779) (see illustration below)
and his partisans spoke Luri, a west Iranian language distinct
from Persian and Kurdish. The Zands (like Nader Shah before them)
were essential in preserving Persia's territorial integrity after
the fall of the Safavids.

Karim
Khan Zand
(d)
Resistance against Ottoman Turks. The bitter legacy of Ottoman
attempts to annex Azerbaijan and Arran, and to dismember Iran,
has been long remembered by the Azerbaijanis, who virtually always
stood as Persia's front line against Ottoman expansionism. Note
the following observation by Professor Atabaki:
'The well-established
Ottoman policy of military expansion into Azerbaijan
goes
a long way in explaining the hostile Azerbaijani attitude towards
what came to be the modern Republic of Turkey"
[Touraj Atabaki, 2000, p.11]
Pan-Turanian
ideologues are attempting to change this history as well. Simply
put, they are perpetuating (yet another) fraudulent view that
Azerbaijanis and Ottoman Turks have been friendly allies ever
since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. This is as absurd
as trying to pretend that Russia and Germany were close allies
during World War One (1914-1918) and World War Two (1941-1945).
The Safavids
(Azerbaijanis), Nader Shah Afshar (Turcomen) and Karim Khan Zand
(Lur) all considered themselves to be the heirs of the ancient
Persian realm. It is truly ironic to see pan-Turanian ideologues
claiming the Safavids and Afsharids (among others) as "ethnic
Turks", as it was these who formed a major factor in resisting
the Ottoman Empire and defeating its attempts to annex Persia.
(e)
World War One. Pan-Turanian ideologues have been deluding themsleves
about the history of the Perso-Ottoman wars ever since the foundation
of the Young Turk movement (and perhaps earlier). When Iran was
in virtual chaos during and after World War One, the Ottomans
simply marched into Iran's Azerbaijan province, believing they
could easily create another "Musavat" style pan-Turanian
movement. Their flawed sense of history (and reality) resulted
in an abysmal failure:
"Contrary
to their expectations, the achievements of pan-Turkists in Azerbaijan
during and immediately after World War One were not very impressive.
Although the province was occupied by Ottoman troops, their attempts
to create a solid base of support among Azerbaijanis ended in
failure
did not succeed in facilitating Azerbaijani-Ottoman
relations
arrest popular leaders Khiyabani and Nowbari and
sent them into exile
what they (the Ottomans) did resulted
in whipping up anti-Ottoman sentiment
"
[Touraj Atabaki, 2000, p.11 - see References]
Very little
is known about Ottoman military activities in Iran during World
War One. The Ottomans had in fact built three airbases in Iranian
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan - note the air base in Baku as well (see
map below of Ottoman bases in Iran and Baku - Nicolle in references):

Turk Base
There are
three ways in which pan-Turanian ideologues are re-writing this
particular saga of history:
[a]
They state that there was no forceful occupation of Iran's Azerbaijan
[b]
That the Azerbaijani's welcomed the Ottoman occupiers
[c] Khiyabani
(item 1a) was a pan-Turanian seperatist and an ally of the Ottomans
(see item 5a).
As with nearly
all of their assertions, pan-Turanian statements diverge from
historical veracity to the extreme.
(3)
Turks have been in the Caucasus for over 5000 Years.
This is a
relatively new claim, apparently first made in the late 1970s.
Pan-Turanian activists claim to have proof that the Turks have
the oldest, most influential and deeply rooted influence in the
Caucasus. Simply put, pan-Turanian ideology now claims not only
Iranian Azerbaijan, but the entire Caucasus (Armenia, The Republic
of Georgia, The Republic of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Chechniya,
and other autonomous regions). The Turkish legacy is claimed to
date back to at least 5000 years.
This is at
best, a grandiose exaggeration. The real influence of the Turks
begins with the Seljuks and Ottomans, and even then, the Turks
are only one more layer upon an ancient region that has seen a
rich and varied legacy. If anything, it is the Persian and (to
a lesser extent), the Greco-Roman legacies that remain in the
Caucasus. The Turks, like the Russians and Ukrainians certainly
have their legacy in the Caucasus. The issue in question is the
exaggeration of the Turkish role, now proposed by pan-Turanian
ideologues.
The Caucasus
is one of the oldest cradles of human civilization - a prime example
being the proto-Kartvelian Hurrian empire (2500-1270 BC) which
at one time ruled much of northwest Iran and contemporary Kurdistan.
The Hurrian legacy is still evident among the Kurds who use the
ergative feature in their speech - a phenomenon seen in modern
Georgian. While the Caucasus has certainly seen its share of Persian,
Greek, Turkish and Russian influence, she has in turn vigorously
and profoundly influenced all of these cultures in turn.
(a) Armenia,
Georgia, Albania/Arran (see and Adontz, Blockley, Chamich, Farrokh,
Garosian, Grousset, Lang, Moses of Dasxuranci, Oberling, Razhdan,
Russell, Whittow in references). Archival records, anthropology,
archaeology, and linguistics fail to substantiate pan-Turanian
ideology. The aforementioned Professor Whittow has concluded that:
"The
oldest outside influence in Trans-Caucasia is that of Persia (p.203)
many
of its populations, including Armenians and Georgians, as well
as Persians and Kurds, the Transcaucasus had much closer ties
with the former Sassanian world to its south and east than with
the world to the west (p.204)".
[Whittow, Mark,
The Making of Byzantium: 600-1025, Berkley: University of California
Press, p. 203-204].
Understandably,
objective information about any Persian legacy in the Caucasus
is viewed as threatening to pan-Turanian activists and their geopolitical
and petroleum supporters in the west (see Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmain's
observations in Part VI, item 8).
With regards
to Armenia, pan-Turanian nationalists are terse and strikingly
clear:
"Armenia
is a fictitious state created on Azerbaijani land ..."
(Excerpted
from the late Heydar Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
"Decree of the President of Azerbaijan on the Genocide of
the Azerbaijanis." 26 March 1998)
It is very
shocking to have a head of state refer to a neighboring nation
in such a dismissive manner. Armenians are perhaps one of the
world's most ancient and inventive people's of history. Simply
put, the late President's assessment widely diverges from reality.
Armenians are now understood to have been derived from the post-Hittite
Phyrgian migrations that originated in the Balkans (they migrated
across the Aegean and Anatolia to reach the Caucasus). They predate
the arrival of any Turkic or Mongol people in the Caucasus by
thousands of years. (See Bishop Ukhtanes of Sebasteia in references)
Armenians
are perhaps one of the oldest surviving Indo-European peoples
and may trace their origins to the ancient Phrygians who migrated
from the Balkans into Anatolia, eventually taking residence in
historical Armenia. They have no anthropological, linguistic or
cultural links to Central Asian Turkic peoples (see item 7 below).
The Armenian
connection to Persia is as old as the Persian Empire itself, and
some would argue even earlier, to the time of the Medes.
From the mid
6th century to the late 4th century BC Armenia and much of Georgia
were a part of the Achaemenid Persian Empire (559-333 BC). The
independent Armenian kingdom was ruled by an Iranian dynasty,
which was a branch of the royal house of Parthia in Persia.
The Iberian
kingdom (The Kartli - the eastern half of modern Georgia) had
Persian ruling classes up to the 6th century AD. Armenians, Georgians
and Albanians/Arranis adopted much of Persia's aristocratic ways,
arts, music, dress, dance, literature, and culture (see Frye 1984,
and Ghirshman in references). Persian words are still prevalent
in modern Georgian (e.g. Panjera-"window") and Armenian
(e.g. Khoda-"God"). Armenian has so many Iranian loan
words that linguists incorrectly viewed it as an Iranian language
for years. Even with the spread of Christianity across the western
Caucasus and with it, increasing Greco-Roman influence, Persian
and Zoroastrian traditions continued to endure.
The Armenian
term for nobility - "Naxarar" - is of Persian (Sassanian?)
origin. Armenian warriors were so highly regarded by the Sassanians
that they were allowed to wear the emblems and regalia of the
"Savaran", Sassanian Persia's elite cavalry. When the
Gok (Celestial/blue) Turks and their Hephthalite allies attempted
to invade Sassanian Persia from Central Asia in 619 AD, it was
Smbat Bargratuni (see depiction by Angus McBride below - Farrokh
in references), a Sassanian general of Armenian origin who conclusively
defeated their forces:
Smbat
Equally important
are Armenian links to the Greco-Roman Byzantine Empire. Many historical
Byzantine figures of note may have had Armenian ancestry. These
may include Leo V (ruled 813-820), Basil I (ruled 867-886), John
Tzimiskes (ruled 969-976), and perhaps the wife of Emperor Theophilos,
Empress Theodora who is reputed to have restored orthodoxy in
843 AD. When examining Byzantine seals and records, a very large
number of Armenian names are evident - examples include Bardas-Bardanes
(related to Persian "Bardia"), Arsabir, Artabasdos (related
to Persian "Arta") and Symbatios. Significantly, a very
large number of officers in the Byzantine armies were of Armenian
origin (e.g. Narses).
One reference
that has been almost totally removed from the Republic of Azerbaijan
by both Soviet and pan-Turanian activists is Moses of Dasxuranci's
History of the Caucasian Albanians (see References). Originally
written in the 10th century AD, this book also reproduced older
manuscripts as well. Dasxuranci has made the connection of the
Albanians/Arranis to Persia absolutely clear. An example of this
is the description of the Sepahbod (Marshall) of Albania and his
officers who fought at the Battle of Qadissiyah in 637 AD (see
Dowsett's translation of Dasxuranci, p.110-113), in which the
Arabs emerged victorious. Not surprisingly, few of the educated
elites in the Republic of Azerbaijan have even heard of Moses
of Dasxuranci.
Byzantine
records make no reference to any Turkic origins with respect to
Armenia, Georgia and Albania/Arran. Instead, as noted previously,
the only outside cultural influences in the Caucasus are those
of the Persians followed by the Greeks.
Turkic peoples
appear as invaders from the Central Asian Steppes which they had
also conquered from their original homeland in Eastern Mongolia.
One of the earliest Turkic arrivals appears to the north of the
Caucasus: the Khazars who converted to Judaism. Byzantine and
Armenian sources make no mention of any of the Turkic arrivals
being indigenous to the Caucasus, Northern Iran or Anatolia. In
almost every case, they came as warrior-invaders and introduced
their language on the majority non-Turkic populations of Arran/Albania,
the historical Azerbaijan (in Iran), as well as Anatolia.
The onset
of powerful Turkish influence can be traced to the Ottoman Empire
and its wars with the Safavid Empire in Persia (see item 5 further
below). Despite centuries of warfare between the Ottomans and
the Safavids (followed by the Afsharids), the legacy of Persian
cultural influence continued unabated. Georgian and Armenian figures
continued to rank prominently in Medieval Persian affairs. Examples
include:
Zaynab Begom
queen of Shah Tahmasp
Allahverdi Khan who was commander of the Safavid Army between
1595-1613)
Khosrow Mirza (Rostam Khan) one of the most important Safavid
officials
Constantin Mirza, son of Georgian king Alexander, sent to govern
Fars province
It is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of prominent Armenians
and Georgians, however, the point has hopefully been made to the
interested reader.
It was only
after the wars of Imperial Czarist Russia that Persia was permanently
pushed out of the Caucasus, except for Azerbaijan and Talysh.
The Treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkemenchai (1827) compelled
Persia to accede to Russia's conquests in the Caucasus.
(4)
The Safavid Empire was Turkish.
Ever since
his brief tenure as president of the Republic of Azerbaijan in
1991-1993, Abulfazl Elchibey (1938-2000) (see photo below) was
vehemently anti-Persian and openly called for the partitioning
of Iran (see Hiro in References).

Elchibey
Note some
of the excerpts of his speech at the V Congress [Kurultai] of
the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, 30-31 January 1998 delivered
in Turkey:
"The
creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in the Northern
Azerbaijan on some of Azerbaijani lands in 1918-1921, and its
restoration
in 1991, does not mean that the Azerbaijan national
liberation movement is over.
The new stage will end with
the creation and or restoration of a united Azerbaijani statehood.
Already [in Iran] there are active organizations, whose
sole purpose is the state independence of the Azeri Turks."
Dr. Elchibey
has conveniently neglected to mention how Arran was re-named as
"Azerbaijan" by pan-Turanian nationalists and that the
real Azerbaijan is situated in Iran today (as noted in Item 1).
Elchibey's claims of the "restoration of a united Azerbaijani
statehood" is void of any historical basis or veracity for
the simple reason that no such state has ever existed.
Dr. Elchibey
based much of his ideology on his re-invention of the Safavids
of Persia as an exclusively Turkish dynasty. He had been a history
professor in Baku during the communist era and had been jailed
for years by the Soviets.
Elchibey was
barred from teaching upon his release. He then turned to archival
and records research, and here is where one may raise a few questions.
As an archival researcher, what went through Elchibey's mind as
he observed the pre-1918 maps showing Arran, its association with
Persia and the history of the Safavid Empire? Perhaps he never
saw them, as the Soviets had already spent over 70 years expunging
archives, re-writing history books and falsifying information
in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Dr. Elchibey's mind was as much
a victim of fabricated information as it was of his own Chauvinism.
In an almost
bizarre act of publicity, Elchibey made a public spectacle of
hanging a portrait of Shah Ismail (ruled 1501-1524), the founder
of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736) in his home (see a European
portrait of Shah Ismail below).

Shah Ismail
This was an
attempt to "prove" that the Safavids were anti-Persian
Turks and a Turkish empire. Note how the portrait contradicts
Elchibey. The partially visible Latin lettering states Ismail
as the king (note the term "Rex") of Persia (note the
"Per" is evident on the top right side of this partial
photo). Elchibey must have seen this portrait during his long
tenure as a professor and archivist. From the viewpoint of a cognitive
psychologist an interesting question can be asked: how did Elchibey's
mind work at accommodating information that contradicted his ideology?
Cognitive dissonance.
More importantly,
Elchibey's ideology runs contrary to the historical fact that
the Safavids endeavoured to recreate the Persian Empire and their
boundaries corresponded to ancient Persia (see map of Sassanian
Persia at its maximum extent in 610 AD (below) and a map of Safavid
Persia (below) at the eve of the Battle of Caldiran (before Ottoman
Sultan Selim's successful attack) in 1514 AD.

Safavid Map

Sassanid Map
While true
that by the time of the Safavids, Turkish had become prevalent
in Iranian Azerbaijan and Arran, the Safavids were vehemently
anti-Ottoman. Elchibey conveniently forgot to mention that the
Ottoman Turks fought Ismail at Chaldiran (1514).and forcibly occupied
much of western and Northern Persia and the Caucasus before being
militarily expelled by Shah Abbas the Great (1587-1629) (see photo
below - see Custos in references) in 1603. Also neglected is the
fact that Safavid Persia and Europe were allies against the Ottoman
Turks for centuries. A dramatic example of this is the role of
the English engineer/adventurers, known as the Sherley brothers
who helped Shah Abbas create an indigenous musket and cannon industry
to fight the formidable Ottomans. Shah Abbas' personal bodyguard
were recruited from the Armenians and the Georgians of the Caucasus
(recall item 3a).

Shah Abbas
Note the clear
inscription "Shach Abas Persarum Rex" - Shah Abbas,
King/ Sovereign of Persia. The copper engraving shown above of
Shah Abbas, made by Dominicus Custos lists him among the Atrium
of the heroic "Caesars" of history - in reference to
his victories over the Ottomans. Custos makes a particular emphasis
on linking Shah Abbas to the "Mnemona Cyrus" (the Memory
of Cyrus the Great of Persia). The Safavids regarded themselves
as the heirs of the Persian Empire, founded by Cyrus the Great
(559-530 BC), as corroborated by European sources (see Matini
1992 in References).
Pan-Turanian
activists (and a number of western academics) are engaged in Herculean
efforts to expunge this information and suppress these historical
archives from Iranian Azerbaijanis. Instead they rationalize the
wars of Shah Ismail and Abbas as "wars between Turkish brothers
based on religion (Sunni versus Shiite)". Fraudulent terms
such as "The great Turkish-Azeri Empire" are also being
invented to push the pan-Turanian agenda forward. All of these
attempts at outright falsification ignore the following:
(a) Why
did the Safavids fight in the name of Persia?
(b)
Why did Shah Abbas decide to make Isfahan the capital of Persia
in 1598?
(c)
Why was Persian architecture, music, literature and the arts so
actively promoted?
(d)
Why did the Safavids so strongly insist on Shiism versus Sunnism
to distinguish themselves from the Sultans of Istanbul?
Incredibly,
Pan-Turanian activists have explained these events as "mistakes".
As the gentle reader, you may wish to contemplate what "mistakes"
these actually signify. But it is here where we run into further
historical ironies. The Ottoman Turks were themselves great patrons
of Persian literature and the Turkish Sultans wrote and spoke
Persian very well. Sultan Selim "Yavuz" (The Grim) (1465-1520)
(see photo below) wrote in Persian to his archenemy, Shah Ismail,
even as Ismail wrote back to him in Turkish!

Selim
Elchibey also
failed to mention that Ismail was in fact Kurdish, and was an
adherent of the ancient Sufi cults of western and northern Persia.
Ismail followed the teachings of Sheik Gilani in Northern Persia
(see photo of Gilani's shrine in northern Persia below - see Tarverdi
in references). Many Kurds in Iraq and Turkey (as well as Turkish
Alevis) follow Gilani's teachings today and view Ismail as an
enlightened Avatar. Ismail also claimed to be a descendant of
the Royal house of the Sassanian Empire (224-651 AD).

Gilani Shrine
Elchibey represented
the final evolution of a racist philosopher, one who projects
imagined events into a history that never existed, and one who
is able to rationalize and believe what his thinking process produces.
Despite their
high level of university education, many pan-Turanian activists
(such as the late Abulfazl Elchibey), are virtually immune to
scholastic or logical explanations that contradict their beliefs.
Their cognitive dissonance leads to reinterpret what is historically
true as False and what is False as truth. The same cognitive process
is true of Western European Nordicists/racial chauvinists, pan-Kurdish
nationalists, Persian chauvinists, and Religious fundamentalists.
Elchibey went
to his grave believing the rhetoric of the Grey Wolves and fleeing
any suggestion that Arran ever existed or (heaven forbid) had
any association with Persia. This is a real tragedy as Elchibey
was known for his piety, incorruptibility, honesty and personal
kindness. It is unfortunate that his thinking process led him
to have such a profound hatred of Armenians and Iranians, peoples
with whom Azerbaijanis as a whole, enjoy rich historical, anthropological
and cultural links.
Less reported
is the fact that after his overthrow by Heidar Aliev (1923-2003)
(below left photo), Tansu Ciller (Turkish Prime Minister 1993-1996,
below centre photo) was implicated in a failed coup to reinstall
Elchibey in Baku. This act resulted in a furious scandal in Turkey,
and Ciller's fanatic pro-Grey Wolf leanings (not to mention a
select group of Turkish officers, who were complicit in the affair)
were now more openly exposed to the Turkish public. It was Suleiman
Demirel (below right photo) who tipped off the Baku government
to the attempted coup.
  
L. Aliev
C. Ciller
R. Demirel
It must be
noted that Demirel has been on record several times noting that
Iran and Turkey have much to gain by directly and constructively
co-operating and working together (rather than against each other)
in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Near East. He is among many
Turks who realize that Iranians and Turks have had a long history
of admixture and cultural exchanges. Tragically, it would appear
that people like Tansu Ciller and the Grey Wolves have a somewhat
different view.
(5)
Sattar Khan was a pan-Turanian separatist.
(a) Mr.
Mahmudali Chereganli.
Mr. Chehreganli
(see photo below) has made a career at attempting to incite hatred
among Iranian Azerbaijanis against Iran. He portrays Azerbaijanis
as "Turks oppressed by Persians", and has been a major
force in the fraudulent re-narration of Babak Khorramdin's rebellion
as an "anti-Persian" movement (see item 6). Chehreganli
leads a movement entitled SANAM (South Azerbaijan National Awakening
Movement) (Kindly see Website References).

Chehregani
cehreqanli@yahoo.com
There is a
parallel movement residing in Baku (allegedly set-up by Azerbaijanis
of Iranian origin) known as the UAM (United Azerbaijan Movement).
There is also the South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement
as well as the Azerbaijan National Front (AZNF). It is SANAM however
that has received the greatest western support (see also Part
VI).
Mr. Chehreganli's
SANAM website is replete with false, simplistic and inflammatory
information. The distortions begin with the personal dossier of
Chehreganli, the chairman of SANAM (Persian section of SANAM website
- see Web References):
"Mahmudali
Chehregani - Chehreganli - was born in the village of Chehregan
His
grandfather Sattar Khan Chehreganli was an intellectual who participated
in three Azerbaijani revolutions: the constitutional movement,
the Azadistan movement, and the national and people's government
he
completed his Doctorate in linguistics at Tehran's Tarbiat Modarress
University
"
The few highlighted
lines are replete with fraudulent information. First, Mr. Chehreganli
is claiming one of Iran's greatest heroes, Sattar khan (1868-1914)
(see photo below) as his ancestor, because both share the name
Chehreganli.

Sattar Khan
People who
share the same last name are not necessarily related. In that
case, all who bear the surname "Smith" are members of
the same family. Another detail not mentioned in SANAM: Sattar
Khan was born in Janali, not Chehregan.
The issue
of kinship is irrelevant. Even if we accept that Mr. Chehreganli
has legitimately "proven" his lineage to Sattar Khan,
he still cannot change the history of his (alleged) grandfather
who fought in the name of a united Persia (see "Sattar Khan"
below). Mr. Chehreganli has re-narrated Sattar Khan as an Azerbaijani
separatist and "a Turkish patriot". Sheikh Khiyabani
(recall item 1d) has also been re-invented as a separatist. Historical
archives contradict Mr. Chehreganli.
While true
that Khiyabani was strongly in favour of local autonomy for Azerbaijan,
he was clear that we wished to do so within the framework of a
united Iran. A sample of foreign archives states that he:
"
had
no desire or intention of severing Azerbaijan from Iran"
[British Foreign Office Archives 371/1278, 11-12 September, 1920
- also cited by Atabaki, 2000, p.50, 205]
Chehreganli
claims that Khiyabani's term "Azadistan" (land of freedom),
and his pursuit of autonomy is clear proof of Khiyabani's separatist
objectives. This is patently false, and is a distorted interpretation
of actual historical events. First, as recounted in item 1d, Khiyabani
was against the Musavat-Rasulzadeh re-invention of Arran/Albania
as "Azerbaijan". The term "Azadistan" was
an attempt to disassociate from the actions of Rasulzadeh and
his supporters in Baku. Second, there is a very large difference
between seeking local autonomy within a sovereign state and being
a pan-Turanian separatist.
The real nature
of Mr. Pishvari's "national and people's government"
has already been recounted in item 1e. Suffice it so say that
Mr. Chehreganli has a talent for blurring facts and re-inventing
them within his fictional narratives.
There are
other puzzling inaccuracies in the SANAM website, namely the chronology
of Sattar Khan's career. Simply put, it would have been physically
impossible for Sattar Khan to have "participated" in
the "Azadistan" and Pishvari movements - Sattar Khan
had already passed away before their onset.
What is most
interesting is Mr. Chehreganli's background and adoption of pan-Turanianism
as a professional career. It is true that Mr. Chehreganli was
a student at Tarbiat Modarress University. In reality, his academic
performance was less than spectacular; he never achieved the graduate
credentials necessary to become a Doctoral candidate. With his
career options narrowing as a result of academic mediocrity, Mr.
Chehreganli "discovered" separatist ethnic politics.
His first "demand" was to exhume his "grandfather's
remains" (meaning Sattar Khan) from Tehran's Shah Abdul Azim
cemetery and "return it to his homeland" (meaning a
separate Azerbaijan from Iran). Mr. Chehreganli had found his
calling at last: a failed academic whose career was to promote
misinformation and alienation.
Fact or fiction,
the next series of events are as entertaining as a Hollywood screenplay.
Mr. Chehreganli ran for Iran's parliament and claimed to have
obtained "800,000 votes". This claim is not only unverifiable,
but suspect (see Part III - items 2-3). He then claims that he
was arrested and tortured because of his "advocacy"
for the rights of his "race". Whatever the truth, Chehreganli
was released from jail and left Iran. He travelled to Baku where
he was awarded an honorary Doctoral degree in recognition of his
anti-Iran political platform.
Western outlets
regularly refer to Mr. Chereganli as a "Professor of linguistics"
when in fact his academic training in the field is suspect at
best. As far as can be determined, Mr. Chehreganli has never produced
a credible dissertation. Nevertheless, his nominal "expertise"
is being cynically trumpeted to project a mirage of academic authority.
These "academic credentials" are being used by western
geopolitical interests to further their economic (i.e. Petroleum)
objectives (Part VI).
(b) Sattar
Khan & the Constitutional Movement of Persia.
The actual
history of Sattar Khan is different from what Mr. Chehreganli
is stating. Sattar Khan was a legendary hero of the constitutional
revolution of Iran (1905-1911), which was virtually the first
of its type in western Asia and the Caucasus. To this day, Iranians
of all stripes refer to him as the "Sardar-e-Melli"
(The national Champion-leader).
The complete
narrative of the Constitutional Movement is beyond the scope of
the discussion here, however a few points may be highlighted,
especially with respect to points being re-narrated by Mr. Chehreganli.
[b1]
Qajar monarch Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1853 - 1907) (see photo below)
agreed to a constitutional monarchy for Persia in August 1906.

Muzaffar al-Din -Shah
[b2] The
first Tehran Assembly or Majlis (1906-1908) managed to limit the
powers of the Shah and his ministers. Among its many reforms was
the freedom of the press. Below is a photo of the building where
the first Majlis was convened.

Majlis
[b3]
Muhammad Ali Shah (1872-1925; ruled 1906-1909) (photo below) moves
to limit constitutionalists (June 1, 1908). Ambassador Zapolski
of Russia and Ambassador Marling of Britain openly warn the Majlis
to comply with the Shah's wishes.

Muhammad Ali Shah
[b4]
Russian Cossack Brigade in Persia (See photo of Russian Cossack
leader Liakhov and a number of his troops - Chaqeri in references),
in support of Muhammad Ali Shah, bombarded the Majlis on June
24, 1908.

Liakhov
[b5]
By July 1908, the Shah imprisons many constitutionalists. See
Photo below (Shuster in references) of their imprisonment at the
Bagh-e-Shah (Garden of the Shah) below:
Strangling persia
[b6] Surviving
delegates fled to Tabriz. In Tabriz, the local Azeris (see photo
of Tabriz Mojaheds below - see Chaqeri in References ) join forces
with these men and organize a resistance army against the anti-constitutionalist
Royalist troops.
Tabriz Mojaheds
[b7] Sattar Khan and his colleague, Bagher Khan, organized
the resistance. Volunteers from the Caucasus join Sattar Khan.
Sattar Khan resists Royalist forces besieging Tabriz for nine
months -attacks barricades on April 22nd, 1909.

Tabriz Mojaheds B
[b8]
The siege of Tabriz ends - Russians invade and occupy Tabriz on
April 1909 - photo below is the Persian Cossack brigade commanded
by Russian officers (see Shuster in References). This unit in
particular was a direct instrument of foreign (Russian and indirectly
British) influence in Persia in the early 20th century.

Russian Cossack Brigade
Sattar Khan
rallied the entire nation of Iran to a constitutional democratic
cause, and in this endeavour had the support of the entire spectrum
of Iran's populace, such as the northern Iranians (see 1908 photo
of Rasht volunteers below - Chaqeri in references) and Bakhtiaris
from Isfahan (see 1909 photo below - Chaqeri in references), not
to mention Mashad (northeast Iran), etc. It was these Bakhtiaris
and Rashtis (from Gilan) who supported Sattar Khan in July 1909.
This allowed for the second Majlis to convene.
Rasht

Bakhtiari
Mr. Chehreganli
avoids any mention of the multi-ethnic nature of Sattar Khan's
movement across Iran (see also the role of the Armenians in part
IV, item 1). Sattar Khan and his allies all fought under the Persian
banner. Note Sattar Khan's own comrades in Azerbaijan, shown fighting
below in Tabriz under the tricolour Persian flag in 1908 (Chaqeri
in references):

Sattar Khan
Professor
Atabaki makes clear that:
"In the
constitutional revolution, like minded Azerbaijanis, Persians,
Bakhtiyaris, and Gilanis fought alongside one another against
the
absolute arbitrary power of the monarchy
their objective
was not to divide this power (of Law and government) among the
different ethnic groupings in the country in order to establish
separate independent states based on ethnic identity." (p.28)
[Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power
in Iran. Published I.B. Taurus Publishers, 2000]
(c) European
Intervention.
Imperial Britain
and Czarist Russia were unhappy at the prospect of a Persian government
that did not cater primarily to their economic interests. They
did their utmost to destroy the fruits of the constitutional movement
and supported the autocratic Shah. Their tactic was to lure Sattar
Khan and Bagher Khan from Tabriz to Tehran. To that end, there
appears to be a connection to a certain telegram issued to Mr.
George Birly, British ambassador in Iran on March 16, 1910 by
the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
If the British
and Russians were hoping to isolate and possibly discredit Sattar
Khan and Bagher khan, they certainly failed. When Sattar Khan
arrived in Tehran on 3 April 1910; the citizens of Tehran were
ecstatic in their welcome and hailed him as a national hero and
messiah. Both Sattar Khan and fellow Azeri comrade-in-Arms, Bagher
Khan had been bestowed with the "Sardar-e-Melli" (Leader
of the Nation) title by the Tehran assembly. The assembly also
ordered that gold plaque portraits be drawn in honour of both
Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan in recognition of their services to
Persia. Throughout Iran, in places such as Rasht, Tehran, Qazvin
or Isfahan, committees proudly bore the name "Sattar Khan".
Sattar Khan and his followers then settled in Tehran's Atabak
Park.
It is here
where a gross tragedy occurred. Details are not totally clear,
however it appears that a coalition of radical Constitutionalists
wanted to disarm Sattar Khan, in the interests of party building
along European lines (see Chaqeri p.166 in References).. These
included many of Sattar Khan's former Azeri comrades from Tabriz
(e.g. Tabriz Social-Democratic group) as well as other Azeris
such as Taqhizadeh. The Armenian Yephrem Khan, another one of
Sattar Khan's comrade in arms, was chief of Tehran's police and
was present in Atabak Park. A shooting incident broke on the night
of August 7, 1910. Sattar Khan was injured by the police and he
died on November 9, 1914. He was buried in Tehran's Shah Abdul
Azim's graveyard. To this day, Sattar Khan's exploits and commitment
to Constitutional reform in Persia are vividly recalled in Iranian
literature.
With respect
to the Atabak Park incident, Chehreganli's supporters claim that
"
Sattar Khan was killed by the racist Persians
".
As noted by Professor Chaqeri:
"What
is usually and intentionally forgotten
is
that
the
revolutionaries were divided into two hostile political camps:
the radicals and the conservatives
this new atmosphere
led
to bloodshed
the idea of disarming (Sattar Khan's) Mojaheds
and Feda'is originated simultaneously in
the radical constitutionalists
and in the British and Russian governments
the majority of
those who took part in the Atabak park incident belonged to the
radical wing of revolutionary fighters
Taqhizadeh (himself
Azeri from Tabriz)
his close associates (included many Azeris)
and
the Tabriz Social-Democratic Group
"
[Chaqeri, Cosroe, Origins of Social Democracy in Modern Iran,
2001, p.166-167].
Predictably,
Mr. Chehreganli's attempts at falsifying history fail when exposed
to archival research. It would appear that Mr. Chehreganli is
hoping to re-narrate the political factions (Radical vs. Conservative)
at Atabak Park in terms of ethnic groups (Persian vs. Azeri).
The Atabak
park tragedy did not derail the democratically representative
Tehran Assembly (Majlis), thanks to the original exploits of Sattar
Khan. The Tehran Assembly, turned to Morgan Shuster (see Shuster
in References), to act as treasurer-general with wide-ranging
powers to finally put Persia's chaotic financial house in order.
Shuster arrived on May 1911. Imperial Russia was furious - Shuster's
reforms were viewed as a threat. The Russians demanded the following
from Tehran's assembly (Majlis) (see Adelson, p.96 in References):
[a] Shuster
was to be immediately dismissed
[b] The
Iranian gendarmes were to replaced by Russian controlled Cossacks
[c]
Persia was to issue an official apology to Czarist Russia
Naturally,
the Majlis rejected this affront to Persia's sovereignty. Russia
promptly invaded Persia through Azerbaijan and by the end of 1911
re-issued its dictates:
[a]
Shuster was again demanded to be immediately dismissed
[b]
No other foreign advisors were to be hired by the Majlis without
prior British and Russian approval
[c]
Persia was to reimburse Russia for the costs of its military invasion
of Persia
The Majlis
again rejected the Imperial Russian demands. The British government
was fully supportive of Russian actions - even the potential of
a modern, forward looking domestic democracy within Iran was unfathomable
to the policymakers of London and Moscow.
The Russians
and their anti-Constitutionalist supporters took full advantage
of these events to kill off many of the Iranian constitutional
activists in Tabriz during their 1911-1912 invasion of northern
Persia. . Note 1912 photo of the Russian hanging of Sattar Khan's
nephews at below A (Chaqeri in References) and the disembowelment
of Yusef Hokhabad by local Russophiles (a Tabriz supporter of
the Iranian constitutional movement - Chaqeri in References) at
below B:

Murder A

Murder B
Note picture
below of more executions of Democratic reformers in Tabriz; figures
with drawn swords and man at right are Tsarist Russian troops:

Murder C
By 1914, 20,000
Russian troops were occupying much of Northern Persia (see Chaqeri,
p.286 and Mclean, p.82 in references). The photographic evidence
of their brutality is historically documented. Chaqeri cites W.S.
Blunt (see References; blunt also cited in Part I, item 1) who
stated:
"There
has been an abominable massacre by the Russians at Tabriz
men,
women and children killed, women raped and every imaginable abomination
perpetuated
This is (British Prime Minister) Grey's doing
as distinctly as he had given the orders; yet almost no protest
is made in our (British) press
"
[Wilfred S. Blunt, My Diaries, Being a Personal Narrative of Events
(Part II: 1900-1914), pp.213, 388-389].
(d) SANAM & the Fabrication of History.
Incredibly,
despite historical archives and massive documentation (see Adelson,
Blunt, Browne, Chaqeri, and Shuster in references), the followers
of Chehreganli reject all of this information and insist that
all of the atrocities were exclusively committed by "murderous
Persians" (virtually no mention of the Russian and British
roles).
The information
expostulated in this section of the commentary is being thoroughly
distorted, re-narrated and even expunged by pan-Turanian ideologues
(recall SANAM website and its narrative of Sattar Khan) and their
western supporters (see Brenda Shaffer in part VI, item 4c).
When factual
information is presented to Chehregani and his followers, the
predictable psychological reaction is that of cognitive dissonance
cited earlier with respect to Professor Diker and Elchibey. Sattar
Khan's movement is even being re-narrated as "a Turkish movement".
If Sattar
Khan was indeed a pan-Turanian activist, then:
(a)
Why would non-Azerbaijanis, like the Rashtis, Mazandaranis or
Bakhtiaris support him?
(b) Why
was he a powerful symbol of the entire constitutional movement
in Persia?
(c) Why
was he honoured twice by the Tehran national assembly?
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